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Abstract
BEFORE DISASTER STRIKES: AN ANALYSIS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
PLANNING (under the direction of Joseph Holland)
I have always been inspired by the outpouring number of volunteers that arrive to
the scene of a natural disaster, ready to help in any way possible. With or without
adequate training, these people arrive with warm hearts and helping hands. I admire their
valiant efforts, however, it has prompted me to ask the question: If our citizens can
respond so quickly in times of adversity, how are city governments preparing
spontaneous volunteers for emergency management planning?
The intent of this thesis is to properly evaluate the emergency management plans
implemented in the cities of Baton Rouge, LA, Spokane, WA, and Oklahoma City, OK.
The thesis will demonstrate that disaster policy is a complex issue and approaches to
disaster response vary. Likewise, government regulations often hinder opportunities
aimed at creating uniformity among emergency management operations. Despite this
challenge, the utilization of spontaneous volunteers during disaster is an area of great
opportunity as it is exempt from many of these regulatory constraints. To employ this
important resource in a coordinated and consistent manner would add tremendous value
to disaster response efforts.
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Chapter 1-Introduction
Within my lifetime, I have witnessed many news reports televising the harsh
effects of uninvited catastrophic disasters that have negatively affected our country. From
the tragedy of 9/11, to the substantial increase in mass shootings, it has been painful to
watch the effects of these events. I personally have experienced one of these traumatic
encounters: Hurricane Katrina. Although the aftermath was unspeakably awful in many
areas across the Gulf Coast, including my hometown, I was able to gain a small source of
positivity and realization through the wreckage: the power of a helping hand. It was
incredible to witness neighbors and community members valiantly joining together to
assist those around them. For a moment in time, we were united for a greater good,
irrespective of race, religion, socioeconomic status, or political ideology. Indeed,
Hurricane Katrina was a terrible storm, but it taught me a valuable life lesson that I still
carry with me today, and ultimately, was the inspiration behind my thesis. Former
President Ronald Reagan echoed these sentiments when he stated: “We can’t help
everyone, but everyone can help someone (“Ronald Reagan Quotes,” 2018).”
In August of 2016, the state of Louisiana experienced tremendous rain and record
flooding. Through social media, an electrician named Timmy Toups realized that his
neighbors, friends, and community members were desperate for assistance as their homes
became engulfed with water. Mr. Toups and his friends immediately acquired his boat
and waded through the flooded streets, supplying resources to those in need and rescuing
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the victims from their submerged homes. The efforts of this small group of men
resurrected an organization known as the “Cajun Navy” that previously operated
following the events of Hurricane Katrina. Today, the organization has greatly expanded,
and they respond with urgency to the needs of others affected natural disasters. The
mission of the Cajun Navy is one that is noble and strong and adequately reflects their
actions: “We don't wait for the help, we are the help! We the people of Louisiana refuse
to stand by and wait for help in the wake of disasters in our state and the country. We rise
up to unite and help rescue our neighbors. Our mission is to help the people who can't get
help, not only in the wake of disaster, but in everyday life (“Louisiana Cajun Navy,”
2018).” These statements embody the meaning of spontaneous volunteerism: motivation
from people who see a need and decide to take action.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines spontaneous
volunteers as neighbors or ordinary citizens that “arrive on-site at a disaster ready to
help” (“Managing Spontaneous Volunteers”, 2018). However, FEMA states that because
they are not affiliated with the existing federal emergency management response team,
their exertions can often be unfavorable to the organization’s efforts. FEMA outlines the
balance of the intentions of spontaneous volunteers in conjunction to the agency’s
protocols with this quote: “The paradox is clear: people’s willingness to volunteer versus
the system’s capacity to utilize them effectively”. (“Managing Spontaneous Volunteers”,
2018)The heart and the inspiration of spontaneous volunteers is quite admirable, but the
practicality and productiveness are difficult to determine when evaluating their works
from an organizational outlook. Thus, the argument of this research is that the
government is not preparing communities for spontaneous volunteers.
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Recently, the Cajun Navy travelled to North Carolina to assist in the efforts
following the aftermath of Hurricane Florence. With their boats, supplies, and equipment,
the group came to the aid of 160 citizens who were found on the roofs of their homes as
well as atop of their cars (“Armed with boats,” 2018). This included a total of 57 rescue
missions, with 2-3 persons being saved during each. However, the Cajun Navy was not
the only group of informal volunteers who dashed to the scene of this disaster. Frank’s
Nation, whose namesake is a bulldog that unfortunately succumbed to the horrible effects
of Hurricane Harvey, arrived to North Carolina to search for lost dogs left behind in the
storm (“Frank’s Nation,” 2018). David Scherff, the foundation’s organizer, assembled a
customized trailer that served as a command center and vehicle for dog transport.
Additionally, Task Force 75, a band of veterans from across the nation, brought its team
to North Carolina to aid in disaster management operations as well (“Here’s How You
Can Help,” 2018). Their goal was to assist in rescue efforts for both people and animals
left stranded in the storm’s aftermath; these teams included search and rescue, animal
rescue, first aid personnel, and humanitarian assistance. Within the 12 days of their
efforts, Task Force 75 worked over 1,800 hours, rescued and evacuated 7 persons, and
sheltered and cared for 125 animals.
These organizations represent the overwhelming power of spontaneous volunteers
who exhibit great skill and expertise within the role of disaster response. Although I
admire the causes and motivations of the groups mentioned, I cannot help but wonder,
what if the affected communities in North Carolina had citizens who were trained to
respond to this disaster? Moreover, where is the local government in response to this
devastation?
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As I began my research searching for more information to support this thesis, one
article listed on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Citizen Corps website
specifically caught my attention. The study was titled “Citizen Corps Behavior Change
Model for Disaster Preparedness,” and it expressed the motivational factors and barriers
that contribute to disaster response (“Citizen Corps Behavior Change Model for Disaster
Preparedness,” 2006). Although it contained a plethora of valuable information, the
article was seeking to address only one simple question: “Why aren’t Americans better
prepared for disasters?” This inquiry was sincerely thought-provoking, but I do not
believe that it necessarily addresses the problem that is at hand. Instead of asking,
“Why?”, Americans should be asking “How?”: how are city governments preparing
spontaneous volunteers for emergency management planning? This specific and direct
question is the impetus and motivation behind this research.
As previously stated, in almost every undesirable and disastrous situation,
bystanders are often the first responders. Regardless of their experience, it is evident that
these spontaneous volunteers have a heart to serve and assist people during times of need
and extreme stress. Their efforts, although limited and not without flaw, are quite
admirable. In addition to their magnanimous attitudes, spontaneous volunteers can be a
tremendous resource in terms of timely manpower. It is not uncommon for many of these
volunteers to be skilled and trained, as their motivation to participate are often driven by
past experiences, such as construction work or employment within the medical field.
However, it is pertinent to note that although these volunteers possess good intentions
and crucial skills, they certainly can provoke chaos and incite harm during times that are
already extreme and difficult.
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Many Americans are benevolent and compassionate, and when tested, are quite
resilient; more often than not, we are willing to offer help to a neighbor in need.
Therefore, it is imperative that we empower our citizens with the knowledge and tools
necessary to adequately respond in times of disaster, and furthermore, hold our
governments accountable for their regulatory authority in disaster response and recovery.
The intent of my thesis is to provide a thorough analysis of the emergency management
planning programs from a sampling of communities in the United States: Baton Rouge,
LA, Spokane, WA, and Oklahoma City, OK. Through this examination, it is my goal that
others can benefit from the findings in order to offer better approach response methods
when an unforeseen disaster occurs.
Chapter 2 will present the history of disaster policy. This chapter will provide
readers with a background knowledge that is necessary to better understand disaster
policy. In Chapter 3, I will discuss the methodology used in my research. Following,
Chapter 4 will present the findings from the research by comparing program snapshots.
Finally, Chapter 5 will provide policy implications and recommendations for
stakeholders to utilize within their communities,
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Chapter 2-Background of Emergency Management
Federal disaster assistance in the United States began in 1803. The catastrophe
was not a Category 5 hurricane or a bloody war, but rather a devastating fire in New
Hampshire (“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010). After the
effects of this fire, the Congressional Act of 1803 was enacted in order to give sufficient
finances to restore the town. This first example exemplifies the meaning of disaster
efforts and volunteerism: no matter the size or the significance, everyone matters.
However, it was not until the 1930s that our government truly involved itself in
emergency management.
1930s-1940s
On January 22, 1932, Congress enacted the creation of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation (RFC) (“Reconstruction Finance Corporation”, 2018). Originally
implemented to provide monetary aid for railroads, businesses, and financial institutions,
the need for a form of federal disaster aid was recognized (“About the Agency”, 2018). In
July of the same year, the Emergency Relief Act of 1932 was passed, and the corporation
was designated to distribute loans specifically for the repair and reconstruction following
earthquakes. With the success of this program, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
(RFC) grew and expanded its protocol to assist financially in the aftermath of other
natural disasters. Additionally, in 1934, the Bureau of Public Roads was instructed to
fund destroyed highways and bridges, an in cooperation with the RFC, was able to revive
demolished infrastructure across our nation.
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Furthermore, following the Great Depression, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
implemented a series of solutions entitled the New Deal to elevate America from its
financial distress. In 1933, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was included
as one of these resolutions. Although this agency was funded and directed by the
government, President Roosevelt desired the TVA to be an entity with the “flexibility and
initiative of a private enterprise (“The 1930s,” 2018). Although the organization did not
directly aid disaster efforts, TVA produced hydroelectric power within the region, and
most importantly, reduced a significant amount of flooding in the area.
However, the Tennessee Valley Authority was not the only disaster aid efforts
that President Roosevelt implemented. In 1939, he signed the order to integrate the Office
of Emergency Management. The function of this new installation was to “advise and
assist” the President in any situation that would threaten the “public peace or safety” of
the United States (Executive Order 8629, 1939). Furthermore, the Office of Emergency
Management provided our nation with an overarching branch that oversees the direction
of disaster relief activities.
Moreover, the need for emergency management grew in the immediate years
succeeding the Great Depression. This policy sector slowly evolved in 1947 as Congress
ordered the War Assets Administration and the Federal Works Agency with the duty of
supplying federal surplus resources to areas in need. Following this demand, in 1950, the
Housing and Home Finance Administration would carry out the necessities of disaster
relief until a more concrete and equipped organization could be created (“History of
Federal Disaster Policy”, 2018).
1950s
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During the 1950s, the United States experienced the devastation of the Cold War
years. As the fear of a nuclear war hovered, America realized the essentiality of
expanding our civil defense efforts (“Review of Historical Trends in Emergency
Management,” 2018). Across the nation, civil defense programs were established in
almost every community, which included a civil defense director to head the efforts.
These directors proved to have an array of experience, as most were retired military
officials. Due to the panic and awareness from our nation’s citizens, in December of
1950, President Harry Truman signed the executive order that created the United States’
first emergency management organization: the Federal Civil Defense Administration
(FCDA) (“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010) .
Under the President’s executive order, the FCDA was commanded with the task
to provide shelters, assistance, and training programs to American citizens in case such a
horrific attack was to occur. Although under a minimal budget, the FCDA was able to
provide materials such as pamphlets and films to the general public. The main goal of this
organization, however, was to empower the people of the United States with the tools and
education necessary to respond to nuclear warfare.
Additionally, Congress passed the Disaster Relief Act of 1950. Although not a
direct disaster aid organization, the act and its amendments allocated funds to provide
assistance to areas influenced by disaster. Originally, the act was designed to reconstruct
local government properties, but the legislation evolved to address the need of emergency
housing and supplies within affected areas of our country (“History of Federal Disaster
Policy”, 2018). The Disaster Relief Act would prove to be very timely in the subsequent
years of its enactment.
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Thankfully, the 1950s passed by without a nuclear strike, but hurricanes
demonstrated to be detrimental to many areas of our country. In 1954, a Category 4
storm, Hurricane Hazel, invaded the states of Virginia and North Carolina (“Introduction
to International Disaster Management”, 2018). The following year, Hurricane Diane
rampaged up the East Coast. However, Hurricane Audrey caused the most damage,
hitting Louisiana and Texas brutally during the summer of 1957. The storm is ranked as
the 7th deadliest hurricane in U.S. history, accounting for at least 500 deaths in the region
(“Hurricane Audrey”, 2018). During this time period, the only manner in which the
government could assist the affected areas was through legislation, such as the Disaster
Relief Act, because a specific disaster aid organization still had not been created.
Realizing the growing need for an emergency management agency, the United States
implemented progressive measures in the following decade.
1960s
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the Office of Emergency
Preparedness within the nation’s executive branch (“History of Federal Disaster Policy”,
2018). The agency was charged with the responsibility of assessing the nation’s natural
disasters, and of course, its establishment was punctual and convenient. Hurricanes
continued to destruct many regions in the country. In 1965, Hurricane Betsy invaded
Florida and the Gulf Coast, growing into a Category 4 storm. Hurricane Betsy would be
one of the costliest storms in our nation’s history, and she became the first hurricane to
acquire damages that exceeded over $1 billion, gaining her the name “Billion Dollar
Betsy” (“Hurricane Betsy”, 2018). A few years later in 1969, Hurricane Camille would
affect the southeastern region in a tremendous way. Hurricane Camille expanded to a
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Category 5 storm by the time she made landfall, becoming one of three hurricanes to ever
reach that level on United States’ soil (“Hurricane Camille”, 2018).
Due to these impactful storms, especially that of Hurricane Betsy, flooding
became a hot issue. Many American citizens were without flood insurance, as it was
expensive and difficult to obtain under a standard homeowner policy (“Introduction to
International Disaster Management”, 2010). Thus, in 1968, Congress authorized the
National Flood Insurance Program. Through this entity, citizens “in communities where
private insurers did not provide coverage” were given the ability to obtain flood
insurance (“History of Federal Disaster Policy”, 2010).
In addition to hurricanes, an unprecedented set of other natural disasters occurred
during this period. In 1962, the Ash Wednesday Storm tore through the East Coast.
Along its way, the storm created new inlets and caused tremendously high tides for three
days. The aftermath left residents with mass destruction and over $300 million of
damages (“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010). Moreover, in
1964, a catastrophic earthquake occurred in Alaska’s Prince William Sound. Measuring
9.2 on the Richter scale, the earthquake prompted tsunamis to occur along the Pacific
Coast. As a result, 123 people were killed by the event.
The combination of these disasters continued to spark the conversation for
emergency management within our country. As the 1970s approached, an expansion of
this field was recognized. Our government would develop an agency that would
dramatically alter the management of disaster relief and response within the nation.
1970s
On February 9, 1971, a massive earthquake hit the San Fernando region in
California. The quake ranked a moderate 6.6 on the Richter scale, but its effects proved to
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be ruinous. With 65 lives lost, it was the third most deadly earthquake in the state, as well
as the second most costly earthquake in property damage (“The 1971 San Fernando
Earthquake”, 1971). Three hospitals were heavily impacted, unfortunately causing more
victims due to their destructions. Although earthquakes were to be expected in this
region, no one could have foreseen the damage that would ensue, thus, leaving little
preparation for disaster response.
Despite the aftermath of the San Fernando earthquake, the government continued
to make progress toward emergency management efforts. Following the National Flood
Insurance Act, Congress passed the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 (“About the
Agency”, 2018). This legislation required the purchase of mandatory flood protection in
any region designated as a Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA). A SFHA was classified
as any area that has been deemed a 100-year or 500-year flood zone (“Flood Disaster
Protection Act of 1973”, 2018). The intent of the Flood Disaster Protection Act was to
secure zones vulnerable to floods in order to reduce costly and detrimental effects for
surrounding citizens.
Shortly thereafter, after unanimous agreement in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, President Richard Nixon enacted the Disaster Relief Act
of 1974 (“Disaster Relief Act of 1974”, 2018). Its passage empowered and supported the
process of presidential disaster declarations (“About the Agency”, 2018). The act would
allow the President the authority to more feasibly execute the administration’s approach
toward forthcoming disasters in the United States.
Although more progressive measures to disaster response had been enacted, the
need for a comprehensive agency was still apparent. At this point within the decade, more
than 100 federal organizations were responsible in performing emergency management
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duties. With President Jimmy Carter as the new head of our nation’s executive branch,
the National Governor’s Association approached the highest office in order to reduce the
number of agencies and “centralize federal emergency functions” (“About the Agency”,
2018).
In conjunction with Congress, President Carter established the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) on June 19, 1978 (“Introduction to International Disaster
Management”, 2010). Through its enactment, FEMA was able to provide our country
with one singular entity dedicated to the management of emergency preparedness,
response, recovery, and mitigation. Furthermore, the organization was appointed a
director that would report its status and progress to the President. As the nation’s new
organization for disaster relief efforts, FEMA absorbed many federal ad hoc agencies
such as the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control
Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, the
Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration, and the Federal
Disaster Assistance Administration (“About the Agency”, 2018).
The establishment of FEMA presented the country with an answer to the many
problems that arose following disasters. No longer would Congress have to continually
rely on creating new legislation in order to address the needs of emergency management.
The subsequent decade of FEMA’s enactment would prove to demonstrate the strength
and capabilities of the organization.
1980s-1990s
In the early 1980s, the United States was not disturbed by any substantial natural
disasters. However, a threat well known to American emerged once again. Nuclear attack
was placed as a top priority, and the concerns and direction of FEMA followed suit. In
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1982, President Ronald Reagan selected General Louis O. Guiffrida as director of FEMA
(“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010). The general’s expertise
included knowledge and experience in the realm of terrorism preparedness and training,
and consequently, he charged FEMA with the incredible responsibility to prepare the
country for any possible nuclear attack. Due to this new focus, resources and funding
slowly depleted from the states’ authority in order to empower security at a national
level.
However, trouble would soon find itself at the center of FEMA’s humble
beginnings. The ethics of Gen. Giuffrida and his administration posed concerning
questions (“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010). As U.S.
Representative Al Gore brought these inquiries to the Science and Technology
Committee, the Department of Justice began to thoroughly examine the intentions and
actions of Gen. Guiffrida and the agency. In the end, Gen. Guiffrida was found guilty of
misuse of government funds and was forced to resign.
In search for another leader of FEMA, President Reagan turned to another
military official to head the agency, General Julius Becton (“Introduction to International
Disaster Management”, 2010). This choice proved to be highly influential in reviving
FEMA’s status and credibility. With his background as Director of the Office Foreign
Disaster Assistance at the State Department, Gen. Becton continued to promote citizen
preparedness at the agency and expanded its duties to aid the Department of Defense
(DOD) with chemical clean-up at army bases. However, in spite of FEMA’s cooperation
with the DOD, this caused major political turmoil as the organization was highly reliant
on the relationship, thus, hindering progress within the entity. Additionally, Gen. Becton
ranked FEMA’s programs based on importance. It was established that earthquakes,
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hurricanes, and flood programs were lesser in comparison to the agency’s other twenty
programs. This shortcoming in judgment would become quite apparent in the latter years
of the 1980s.
Now a senator, Al Gore once again called FEMA out on its missteps. He
disagreed with the priorities of the organization and referenced a scientific study that
predicted possibly 200,000 casualties if an earthquake occurred on the New Madrid fault
(“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010). Thus, the National
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, created by Congress, ordered for FEMA to
develop an appropriate agenda designed to respond to tumultuous earthquakes.
Fortunately, this would eventually lead to the creation of the Federal Response Plan for
the organization. Another addition to America’s disaster policy would be the
implementation of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act
(“About the Agency”, 2018). Through this legislation, presidential declared disasters
could receive prompt financial and physical assistance from FEMA through governmentcoordinated relief efforts. However, even with a more powerful authority and added
assistance from Congress, FEMA would soon be tested and experience an unforeseen
series of catastrophic events.
On September 22, 1989, Hurricane Hugo made landfall on the American
mainland, fiercely striking both North Carolina and South Carolina (“Hurricane Hugo”,
2018). Hugo resulted in over $15 billion in damages in addition to 86 deaths
(“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010). It was the costliest
hurricane at this time and the worst storm in over a decade. This event should have been
FEMA’s opportune time to prove its competency, but the organization failed due to its

13

lack of communication at the state level. Even a personal phone call from South Carolina
Senator Ernest Hollings did not prompt FEMA to act in a rapid or effectual manner.
Amidst the 1989 World Series in Oakland Stadium, the Loma Prieta Earthquake
transpired on October 17 in the San Francisco area (“San Francisco Earthquake of 1989”,
2018). Twenty-six minutes prior to the first pitch, the quake shook the stadium while on
live television. The structure withstood the seism, but the rest of the region was not as
fortunate. The earthquake was one of the most destructive to ever hit the area, costing
over $5 billion in damages (“San Francisco Earthquake of 1989”, 2018). Once again,
FEMA was impugned for its absence of preparedness and response.
A few years later, Hurricane Andrew would strike Florida, and later Louisiana, on
August 24, 1992 (“20 Facts About Hurricane Andrew”, 2012). Although it began as a
tropical wave off the coast of Africa, Andrew would grow to a massive Category 5
hurricane, and the U.S. was not prepared for its wrath. Demolishing 25,524 homes and
causing damage to 101,241 others, the effects of the storm were largely due to
“inadequate” building codes and inspections (“20 Facts About Hurricane Andrew”,
2012). However, Andrew would not be the last hurricane to terrorize the nation, as
Hurricane Iniki would make landfall in Hawaii on September 11 (“Hurricane Iniki”,
2018).
Iniki would live up to its name, meaning sharp and piercing winds, as the
hurricane would be the most destructive and powerful storm to ever hit the island.
Undeniably, FEMA’s attention and response to hurricanes and earthquakes had been
deficient, based on previous experiences of this kind. As expected, FEMA was
inefficient and slow to respond once again, and as a result, President George H. W. Bush
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ordered the Secretary of Transportation, Andrew Card, to head the relief efforts in Hawaii
(“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010).
Hurricane Hugo, the Loma Prieta Earthquake, and Hurricane Andrew revealed
flaws and weaknesses within FEMA’s organizational structure. To contend with these
natural catastrophes, Congress appropriated funds from the Community Development
Block Grant Disaster Recovery program - utilized for Presidentially declared disasters in
typically low-income areas - to aid in recovery and rebuilding (“History of Federal
Disaster Policy”, 2018). In 1993, President Bill Clinton recognized the faults of FEMA
and appointed James Lee Witt as its director in an effort to revitalize and restore the
agency (“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010).
James Lee Witt would be the first Director of the organization to have past
experience in emergency management, as he had previously led the Arkansas Office of
Emergency Services (“James Lee Witt”, 2018). Through his leadership, Witt would build
credibility and establish state partnerships at the agency. Because of his efforts, Witt “is
credited with turning FEMA from an unsuccessful bureaucratic agency to an
internationally lauded all-hazards disaster management agency” (“James Lee Witt”,
2018). While Witt exhibited tremendous success, he and the organization would
encounter obstacles of natural disaster along the way.
In 1993, nine states in the Midwest were inflicted by an incredible amount of
flooding (“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010). FEMA’s
response to this event was one of precaution and protection rather than reaction. The
agency called for a mass relocation program during the time period, thus evacuating
citizens from the harmful effects. This was the first success exhibited under Director
Witt’s tenure. Shortly thereafter, the Northridge Earthquake of 1994 shook this region of
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California (“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010). The quick
turnaround did not seem to confound the new leadership at FEMA. Due to strengthened
building codes following the San Fernando earthquake, as well as the agency’s
development and implementation of new service delivery technology, casualties were
significantly reduced (“1994 Northridge Earthquake”, 2018). Once again, Director Witt
and his organization solidified the significance and achievement of FEMA’s new
direction.
However, 1995 would introduce a new disaster threat to our nation: terrorism. The
Oklahoma City Bombing sparked the conversation of which entity would lead our
country in the protocol and aftermath of these types of events. FEMA sparked
controversy as they did not immediately assume the responsibility. Many believed that
the agency was the most equipped to handle these attacks, and their reluctance to accept
the role was quite disappointing. Although the domain of FEMA certainly invokes an
“all-hazards approach,” the organization simply lacked the resources and expertise to
handle the effects of chemical, biological, and other miscellaneous weaponry
(“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010).
Despite the confusion and debate regarding the authoritative figure for terrorist
attacks, FEMA continued to pursue their mission of ensuring Americans’ safety. On
November 22, 1999, the organization implemented Project Impact: Building A DisasterResistant Community (“Project Impact”, 2018). Following the flooding left by Hurricane
Floyd, FEMA noted the magnitude of the many altered lives left in the aftermath of the
storm. While natural disasters and their effect are difficult to predict, the impact can be
greatly reduced through preventative measures. With the establishment of Project Impact,
FEMA sought to emphasize this idea by promoting “total community involvement”
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through empowering the program’s partners (such as local government officials, civic
organizations, and citizens), assessing the community’s risk of natural disasters,
identifying priorities and goals, and educating the community on disaster protocol and
information (“Project Impact”, 2018). Project Impact was well-received by Congress and
the nation alike and provided substantial momentum for the agency as the new
millennium approached.
2000’s
With the election of George W. Bush, the President appointed a new Director to
head FEMA, Joe Allbaugh. The Director’s first major order of business would be the
recreation of the Office of National Preparedness, which was abolished under Director
Witt’s administration (“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010).
However, the sector would take on the hefty responsibility of terrorism response, finally
charging a government entity with its accountability. The Office of National
Preparedness’ new duty was certainly a step in the right direction, but unfortunately, no
measures could have prepared the nation for the events that occurred on September 11,
2001.
On that horrendous day, the agency enacted its Federal Response Plan and carried
out its operations as efficiently and quickly as possible. FEMA’s response demonstrated
the competence and growth of the organization, but additional action was required. The
following year, President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002
(“Introduction to International Disaster Management”, 2010). The legislation created the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and integrated twenty-two federal agencies
under its jurisdiction, including FEMA (“Who Joined DHS”, 2018).
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The strength of the new department and its entities would be tested during the late
summer of 2005. Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a Category 4 hurricane along the
Mississippi and Louisiana Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, resulting in catastrophic
structural devastation and physical casualties. Not anticipating the damage and
destruction from a storm of this magnitude, FEMA was grossly unprepared and cited a
number of failures. When the levees broke in New Orleans, the organization disregarded
the reports of this disastrous event from its sole staffer in the area; conclusively, the city
would later be 80 percent under water (“11 years after Katrina”, 2016). In addition,
FEMA was unaware for three days that hundreds of residents were trapped in the
flooding with no supplies at the local convention center (“11 years after Katrina”, 2016).
In the midst of FEMA’s response and rescue to the tragedy of New Orleans, the agency
rejected and discarded assistance from other resources. The Department of Interior was
denied personnel, as well as Louisiana’s Wildlife and Fisheries department’s donation of
300 rubber boats (“11 years after Katrina”, 2016). Furthermore, FEMA’s missteps
continued throughout the recovery stage, as makeshift trailers were awarded to those who
lost their homes. The intent of these trailers was to provide temporary lodging for 18
months before a permanent replacement could be replenished (“11 years after Katrina”,
2016). However, this goal would not withstand as the trailers would diminish over a span
of years, with the last trailer left being utilized until 2012 (“11 years after Katrina”,
2016).
FEMA would learn from its mistakes and seek to improve its measures with
President Bush’s signing of the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 (“PostKatrina”, 2018). The order called for a reorganization of the agency and mandated for
FEMA to fill the “gaps” that Hurricane Katrina revealed (“Post-Katrina”, 2018). Such
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improvements included a registry system dedicated to reuniting separated families and a
devotion to precautionary evacuations (“Post-Katrina”, 2018).
Current Federal Emergency Management
Since the event of Hurricane Katrina, the government has realized the significance
of learning from its shortcomings in the midst of disasters. For example, in 2012,
President Obama acknowledged the degree of Hurricane Sandy and sought to remedy its
effects through his order of a specified Rebuilding Task Force. The task force was
designated to develop “model resilience policies for vulnerable communities” and
encourage preventive measures (“History of Federal Disaster Policy”, 2018).
Additionally, our nation seeks to aid those who are hurting and in need. In 2014, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development issued the National Disaster Resilience
Competition in order to award $1 billion to eligible communities that need to “recover
from prior disasters and improve their ability to withstand and recover more quickly from
future disasters” (“National Disaster Resilience Competition”, 2015). While it should be
noted that our government has both succeeded and failed in its disaster-related endeavors,
the mission statement of FEMA still boldly stands and continues to be the motivation for
the unforeseeable situations our nation faces: “helping people before, during, and after
disasters” (“About the Agency”, 2018).
Inspired by FEMA’s mantra, this thesis seeks to analyze the emergency
management plans that are created and carried out before, during, and after disasters.
Specifically, the research is driven by the argument as to whether or not cities
government can appropriately manage the influx of spontaneous volunteers in
conjunction with their emergency management operations. The United States’ disaster
policy has grown significantly in the last century and has continued to do so with the
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culmination of FEMA. However, it is important to hold our local governments
accountable and push them in order to enhance emergency management approaches, and
most significantly, save more lives.
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Chapter 3-Methodology
The next chapter will follow a document review model. Utilizing this approach, I
collected data from a set of existing documents from emergency management offices.
The purpose of a document review is to gather background information in order to
understand the “operation of the program you are evaluating and the organization in
which it operates” (“Evaluation Briefs No. 18”, 2009). Furthermore, I have accessed
emergency management documents from three cities, evaluated their plans, and
summarized my findings (“Evaluation Briefs No. 18”, 2009). From the information
collected, I will present my recommendations and conclusions regarding the emergency
management plans selected.
In 2014, FEMA executed a series of case studies entitled “Preparedness Grant
Case Studies.” Through the studies, the agency evaluated how urban areas across the
United States utilized homeland security grants. FEMA selected programs that have
benefitted from this aid and offered information regarding the programs’ outcomes. The
programs’ focus includes a diverse range of disasters, such as tsunamis, hurricanes, and
tornadoes. FEMA accredits the selection of the programs to “a mix of homeland security
non-disaster grant programs, to ensure geographical diversity, and to link grant
investments with recent events” (“Preparedness Grant Case Studies”, 2014). Ten case
studies were performed highlighting projects in eight U.S. communities: Denver, CO,
Seattle, WA, Oklahoma City, OK, Spokane, WA, Grays Harbour County, WA,
Lafourche Parish, LA, Baton Rouge, LA, and the Chafee, El Paso, Lake, Park, Teller
Counties of Colorado.
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Utilizing their case study model, I investigated emergency preparedness plans among a
chosen group of these eight areas. I assessed their programs to convey the effectiveness
of their emergency management preparedness. To conduct my research, I limited the
analysis to cities rather than communities. I then generated the five remaining cities into
an online randomizer in order to narrow my investigation to three cities. The randomizer
then numbered the cities 1-5, from which it selected three. The finalized cities include:
Baton Rouge, LA, Spokane, WA, and Oklahoma City, OK.
Furthermore, I analyzed documents from the cities’ Department of Homeland
Security websites in order to gather information about their preparedness plans. Each
city’s department contains thorough Emergency Operations Plans, including sections and
additional material specifically pertaining to emergency preparedness methods. Based on
my findings, it is my hope that the preparation procedures evaluated can adequately be
applied to other communities who experience similar natural disasters within their region.

22

Chapter 4-Findings
Case #1: Baton Rouge, LA
The city of Baton Rouge, LA, presents an Emergency Operations Plan which can
be accessed through the Mayor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness (MOHSEP). The document consists of thirty-eight pages and is divided into
the following sections: Purpose and Scope, Situation and Assumptions, Concept of
Operations, Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities, Direction and Control,
Continuity of Government, Administration and Logistics, Plan Development and
Maintenance, Authorities and References. In addition to the Emergency Operations Plan,
MOHSEP has launched a campaign entitled “Red Stick Ready” to promote specific
educational programming including all aspects of emergency management preparedness
regarding hazard, family, business, kid, pet, and whole community preparedness. Table 1
provides an overview of MOHSEP’s preparedness operations.
Baton Rouge Emergency Operations Plan
The Baton Rouge Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) is divided into the following
sections: Purpose & Scope, Situation & Assumptions, Concept of Operations,
Organization & Assignment of Responsibilities, Direction & Control, Continuity of
Government, Administration & Logistics, and Plan Development & Maintenance. To
begin, the Purpose and Scope section provides basic and necessary information about its
role and the community. The purpose of the EOP is found within the first line and states
that the document is “an overview of the key function and procedures that State or Local
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agencies will accomplish during an emergency, including the roles that Local, State,
Tribal, Federal, and private agencies will take to support local operations” (“Basic Plan”,
2018). Furthermore, the EOP illustrates the landscape and characteristics of the area
through the Situation & Assumptions section. East Baton Rouge Parish, where the city of
Baton Rouge is located, is bordered by three integral waterways: the Mississippi River,
the Amite River, and Bayou Manchac, with an elevation level of 69 feet above the Gulf
of Mexico sea level (“Basic Plan”, 2018). Additionally, the EOP highlights its susceptible
hazards as well as its resources and assets. Besides national security threats, the
community is vulnerable to the effects of the following natural disasters: hurricanes,
floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes. However, the EOP boldly states that it contains the
resources necessary to assess these disasters, such as “man power, equipment and skills
of the governmental agencies, medical, health and allied professions and groups, and
knowledge of survival actions possessed by the public” (“Basic Plan”, 2018). Further, the
section concludes that the extent of natural disasters that could affect the area are largely
unprecedented, but MOHSEP assures the public that they possess the resources and
capabilities to effectively subdue and manage the circumstances.
Within the next section, Concept of Operations, the EOP outlines a general
overview of responsibilities and actions. The Mayor-President of Baton Rouge is first and
foremost the authority on emergency preparedness operations, and the Office of
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Director assumes the role as his or her
Chief of Staff during times of disaster. However, if the aftermath and consequences
exceed the capabilities of their department, parish forces will act, and the Federal
Government will allocate appropriate support to the State. An interesting component of
the operations plan includes the call of local volunteers. Specifically, the EOP states that
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“it may be necessary to draw on people’s basic capabilities and use them in areas of
greatest need” (“Basic Plan”, 2018).
A significant portion of the Concept of Operations section dictates the structure
and obligations of the entities within the department when an emergency occurs. This
includes:
1. The Incident Commander (Mayor) and his or her staff
2. Finance and Administration
3.

Logistics

4. Operations
5. Planning
The Incident Commander and his crew are charged with the responsibility of controlling
the situation, ensuring the safety of endangered citizens, securing emergency responders,
and conserving property. Essentially, this sector organizes the activities and measures
needed for the operation. In addition to the Incident Commander, there are three staff
members essential to the operation: the Safety Officer, the Public Information Officer,
and the Liaison. The Safety Officer adequately gauges the extent of the disaster at hand
and employs the accommodating procedures. The Public Information Officer and the
Liaison are fundamental within the scope of communication. The Public Information
Officer gathers the correct data regarding the disaster and response efforts in order to
relay it to the media. He or she is responsible for the broadcast of public actions such as
evacuations. Moreover, the role of the Liaison is to correspond and interact with other
agencies critical to the emergency management team and its operations.
The Departments of Finance and Administration, Logistics, Operations, and
Planning assist in the details, specifics, and acquisitions necessary for the intended
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disaster response. Through the Finance and Administration team, appropriate resources
are acquired to sustain the event and its estimated cost is calculated and recorded. These
staff members manage and secure assigned financial assets during emergency response
and recovery efforts. The Logistics department at its core “provides services and support
systems to all organizational components involved in the incident” (“Basic Plan”, 2018).
This includes the procurement of resources such as medical aid, stress debriefing,
supplies, equipment, and facilities. Furthermore, the Operations team is stationed within
the command post and carries out the “tactical objectives” set in place by the Incident
Commander (“Basic Plan”, 2018). The staff is responsible for assuring that the operation
is run smoothly and efficiently. Lastly, the Planning sector is influential in the decisionmaking process of the emergency. They are tasked with researching past disasters and
actions in accordance with the ongoing event. The staff ensures that the strategic plan is
up to date with the situation at hand and predicts its potential outcomes.
An important note within the Concept of Operation Section highlights the entity,
Louisiana Capital Area Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters (LCAVOAD). The
LCAVOAD is charged by MOHSEP with the coordination of volunteer agencies,
spontaneous volunteers, and donations. The organization states that its mission is “to
enhance the effectiveness of service providers and stakeholders who help communities
prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters, with the overall purpose of lessening
the impact of disasters” (“Louisiana VOAD”, 2019). Furthermore, their doctrine is
inspired by cooperation, communication, coordination, and collaboration (“Louisiana
VOAD”, 2019). Based on these ideals, LCAVOAD conducts activities to encourage the
community, advocates for certain public policies beneficial to disaster efforts, and
promotes proven and leading practices available through providing services. With its
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partnership with the LCAVOAD, MOHSEP is able to utilize the organization’s strengths
and complete its operations with greater efficiency.
The Organization & Assignment of Responsibilities assigns the roles of local,
state, tribal, federal, and private agencies to assist during times of disaster. From Animal
Control to Volunteer Organizations, MOHSEP lists every partnered organization that has
offered their services and resources. The EOP specifies a few federal departments that
collaborate in these emergency management functions, such as the United States Coast
Guard. However, MOHSEP largely utilizes its resources at the local and state level.
These organizations and agencies span from a variety of sectors, including the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Equality, the Parish Attorney, the Baton Rouge River
Center, and the Capital Area Transit System. Additionally, the local school boards and
universities cooperate and manage emergency communications with MOHSEP. While it
is admirable that MOHSEP engages with many organizations, there is a fault that lies
within this section. The EOP states that tribal agencies are represented within the
Organization & Assignment of Responsibilities, however, there is no evidence of the
collaboration. This is not only a shortcoming in regard to the EOP’s credibility, but it
fails to account for a population.
Under the Direction and Control Section, the powers of Baton Rouge’s
emergency management are dictated. Civil Defense Ordinance No. 8434 authorizes all
emergency operations and allows for the Mayor-President and the Director of MOHSEP
to enact the functions they deem appropriate for the situation (“Basic Plan”, 2018). A
crucial component of their responsibilities includes the decision for evacuation under
severe conditions. It is noted that the Mayor-President and Director will implement the
proper protocol to make this declaration, but during this process, the law enforcement and
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fire department have the authority to begin evacuation measures if “immediate threat to
life and property is imminent” (“Basic Plan”, 2018). Additionally, the address of the
Emergency Operations Center is listed, but the EOP assures that there are alternate
channels and locations, such as the Mobile Command Post, that can be invoked when
necessary.
The Continuity of Government section illustrates essentiality of establishing the
relocation of government, the preservation of records, and the lines of succession at both
the local and state government levels. The EOP emphasizes that “effective
comprehensive emergency preparedness operations” rely on the survival of these
functions (“Basic Plan”, 2018). These measures preserve the viability and success of the
government during an emergency as leadership is affirmed and important documents are
protected.
The Administration and Logistics section accounts for the protocols and
procedures implemented once a disaster has been detected or has occurred. The EOP
commences the segment by calling attention to agreements and understandings. If the
local government is incapable of supplying the resources necessary for their emergency
management operations, requests will be made to “other local jurisdictions, higher levels
of government, and other agencies” for assistance (“Basic Plan”, 2018). However, these
affiliations and terms have already been established, allowing for more efficient response
and relief efforts from these entities. The EOP also assures the public that they follow the
proper guidelines in the areas of consumer protection, nondiscrimination, administration
of insurance claims, duplication of benefits, use of local firms, and preservation of
historic properties. Most importantly, the sections detail the subject of information
collection and dissemination. It is the intent of MOHSEP to alleviate “confusion,
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misinformation, and rumors” through accurate data and notifications (“Basic Plan”,
2018). However, the unpredictability of disasters can alter the accessibility and
distribution of information, and the EOP stresses the importance of awareness and
preparedness for cases such as this.
Through the Plan Development & Maintenance section, the Director of MOHSEP
designated the obligation of emergency planning. He or she will guide the disaster
response efforts as well as inform the Mayor-President, East Baton Parish Metropolitan
Council, department directors, and other officials of MOHSEP’s emergency preparedness
plans and the EOP. To conclude the document, it is stated that the Mayor-President or the
Director are authorized to enact the Plan upon their order (“Basic Plan”, 2018). Further,
an overview of this section can be found in Table 1:
Table 1. Baton Rouge Emergency Management Plan Overview
Plan Leadership

Plan Organization

Disasters
Anticipated
Disaster Rating
Resource
Utilization
Volunteer
Management
Disaster
Preparedness

Lead Agency: Mayor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
(MOHSEP)
Chief of Staff: Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Director
Essential Staff: Safety Officer, Public Information Officer, Liaison
Purpose and Scope
Situations and Assumptions
Concept of Operations
Organization and Assignment of Responsibility
Direction and Control
Continuity of Government
Administration and Logistics
Plan Development and Maintenance
Authorities and References
National Security Threats
Natural Disasters (hurricanes, floods, tornados, earthquakes)
Plan does not stage disasters
Local and state resources
Federal resources only if necessary
Louisiana Capital Area of Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (LCAVOAD)coordinates volunteer agencies, spontaneous volunteers, and donations
Red Stick Ready – an all hazard education and preparedness program to empower citizens
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Red Stick Ready
An extension of Baton Rouge’s Emergency Operations Plan is the Red Stick
Ready campaign. Baton Rouge translated from French means “Red Stick”, which is the
inspiration behind the initiative’s title (“What Is Red Stick Ready?”, 2019). The program
was created in the spring of 2005 and cites the events of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as a
learning experience for its growth and development. The mission of Red Stick Ready is
to encourage “the community to take personal responsibility with the necessary items and
plans in place when a disaster or emergency strikes” (“What Is Red Stick Ready?”,
2019).
The Red Stick Ready campaign empowers its citizens with preparedness plans
designated for all hazards, families, kids, pets, and businesses. The program is intentional
toward community outreach and hosted a “Red Stick Ready Day” at the Mall of
Louisiana in the summer of 2018 (“Public Outreach”, 2019). The event promoted public
safety precautions and informed the community about MOHSEP’s emergency
management efforts. An integral component of the education is its easy to follow, locally
available flyers and handouts. Red Stick Ready informs the community of the top ten
potential hazards to the area: flooding, hurricanes, tornadoes, pandemic, severe weather,
winter weather, cyber incidents, extreme heat, fires, and hazardous materials (“All
Hazards Preparedness”, 2019). Each incident is accompanied with direction to FEMA
resources or a detailed flyer specific to that disaster. The campaign heavily focuses on
extreme heat, hazardous materials, hurricanes, severe weather, and tornadoes, and
includes handouts that educate the public on the expectations before, during, and after the
specified disaster.
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Red Stick Ready’s family preparedness planning asserts the significance of
creating both an emergency communications plan and a disaster supply kit for the
household. The Red Stick Ready website offers a printable template for one to write
beneficial information pertaining to their family and well-being. The document includes
spacing for pertinent medical information and emergency contacts. Additionally, it
provides a section for other valuable phone numbers, such as the police department,
hospital, pharmacy, and veterinarian. The other crucial element of the family
preparedness plan is the acquisition of disaster supplies. Red Sticky Ready advocates for
the “72-hour supply kit” to be assembled for each family member (“Family
Preparedness”, 2019). Although the supplies are up to the family’s discretion, the integral
resources of the kit include 1-15 gallons of water per day, food, medication, money,
personal documents, batteries, flashlights, and chargers (“Family Preparedness”, 2019).
The campaign also suggests that nonessential items, such as games and clothes, be
integrated into the kit.
Moreover, the Red Stick Ready campaign administers a kid’s preparedness
model. It is comprised of activity books, coloring books, and online games that are both
engaging and educational. These materials emphasize the importance of recognizing
when a disaster is imminent, understanding the resources available for utilization, and the
importance of securing contacts for parents and other essential individuals. Red Stick
Ready also issues a call to join the local Junior Community Emergency Response Team
(Jr. CERT). The program employs first responders to train youth in the community on
emergency preparedness efforts (“JR CERT”, 2019). The goal of Jr. CERT is to equip
participants with the tools necessary to prepare for an emergency, in hopes that they in
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turn will pass along valuable information they have learned to family members, friends,
and others.
The program highlights that pets are indeed a part of the family, too. As discussed
with family preparedness, Red Stick Ready advises pet owners to prepare a disaster
supply kit for their pets as well. Suggested items include a pet carrier, harness, leashes,
collars, ID tags, food, water, treats, toys, medications, waste disposal supplies, and photo
IDs of each pet with their pet owner (“Pet Preparedness”, 2019). Red Stick Ready also
offers helpful tips to ensure the pet’s security; for example, the campaign advises that if
able, the owner should arrange for the pet to stay in a shelter, boarding kennel, or
veterinary clinic prior to the natural disaster. Through this outlet, the safety of both the
owner and the pet is maximized. To supplement the information, the pet preparedness
plan directs owners to resources such as the Companion Animal Alliance, the LSU
Agriculture Center, and the LA State Animal Response Team (“Pet Preparedness”, 2019).
In contrast, the business preparedness plan is forthright and concise. If a business
does not possess an emergency plan, a system for tracking business resources, or an
updated emergency communication plan for its employees, Red Stick Ready strongly
suggests that they follow FEMA’s protocol. The agency offers tailored resources
pertaining to emergency response planning, continuity planning, and continuity resource
requirements (“Business Preparedness”, 2019). Additionally, the Red Stick Ready
campaign ensures that their interests for businesses goes beyond planning. After a
disastrous event, East Baton Rouge Parish proclaims that they are dedicated to “the
restoration of local businesses that provide essential goods and services to the
community” (“Business Preparedness”, 2019). This is accomplished through joint
collaboration as the business is able to continue its day-to-day functions while making
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their services available to the public. Once the area is deemed secure for re-entry, the
Parish promotes the revival of businesses as their operations contribute to the
revitalization of the community.
The final component of the Red Stick Ready campaign is the whole community
preparedness approach. To ensure success following a disaster, it is vital that the
community collaborates together. Neighbors are often the actual first responders to a
disaster, and their efforts can allow the “real” first responders to exert their resources
toward other needs in the community; however, it is imperative that citizens are
adequately prepared. First, Red Stick Ready recommends the Buddy System service to
connect with friends and family. The Buddy System allows for communication between
neighbors before, during, and after a disaster to assure that all needs are met between
parties (“Whole Community Preparedness”, 2019). Moreover, if one is able to identify
with a certain subdivision, it is encouraged to join that subdivision’s association as an
advanced means to meet neighbors and contribute to the neighborhood safety. Red Stick
Ready provides a list of these subdivisions for communication purposes. In conclusion,
the program offers additional neighborhood tips endorsed by FEMA as well as
preparedness resources regarding different types of communities, such as universities and
faith-based communities (“Whole Community Preparedness”, 2019). The whole
community preparedness planning reflects a holistic and inclusive approach as the
campaign seeks to ensure that Baton Rouge and its citizens are “Red Stick Ready”.
Baton Rouge Analysis
Given the fact that Baton Rouge has experienced its fair share of natural disasters
in the form of hurricanes and flooding, it is evident that their leadership understands the
necessity of emergency preparedness, and particularly how it relates to citizen volunteers.
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For example, the successful revitalization of the Cajun Navy gives credence to the value
of trained volunteers and their usefulness during disaster response and recovery efforts.
Therefore, it is no surprise that the Red Stick Ready program was created as a proactive
approach to educating and preparing its citizens before disaster strikes. This preemptive
program is significant in that it is comprehensive, addresses the needs of families as well
as children and pets, and is easily accessible. Its outreach extends beyond protocols and
addresses citizens through public service events and programming for children.
Engaging children in emergency preparedness is crucial to the long-term viability of
disaster preparedness programs. Furthermore, when citizens possess readiness skills,
they become self-sufficient, freeing emergency personnel to direct their attention to more
critical needs. The Buddy System is an example of the effective utilization of citizen
volunteers. Encouraging accountability within neighborhoods and focusing on neighbors
helping neighbors, allows everyday citizens to act as essential personnel in the protection
of people and property post disaster. An additional strength of the Red Stick Ready
program is that it is dynamic and allows for expansion as additional resources and
recommendations become available. For instance, the program could incorporate
supplemental plans focused on individuals with disabilities as well the senior adult
population. The opportunities for this program are endless and vital for successful
emergency management.
Another highlight of the Baton Rouge Emergency Preparedness model is its
partnership with the LCAVOAD. This in an excellent example of the value of
communication and collaboration during times of crisis. The LCAVOAD’s management
of volunteers and donations during disaster recovery minimizes chaos that would
otherwise inundate a command center and facilitates a more efficient use of resources.
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Expansion of this program could include working in a collaborative partnership with Red
Stick Ready. Through community outreach events, citizen volunteers could be recruited
and registered into a databank based on their skills and abilities.
As a whole, the EOP and the Red Stick Ready program instill a holistic and
broad-based approach to emergency management. Logistically, the program is thorough
and provides a systematic approach to the implementation of the emergency management
plan following disaster. Leadership responsibilities and roles are clearly documented in
the EOP and the document gives a regulatory impression. Perhaps the addition of more
inclusive language and examples of cooperation among local, state, and federal agencies
would provide a more unifying appeal. In addition, the EOP should establish a means of
classifying the magnitude of a disaster so that the urgency of response and resource
allocation can be quickly communicated among various entities.
Case #2: Spokane, WA
Through the Greater Spokane Emergency Management (GSEM) Office, the city
of Spokane, WA, provides its community with the Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan (CEMP). The plan itself consists of thirty-eight pages, in addition to
corresponding appendices and attachments. The CEMP was conducted through a forum
consisting of local organizations. The results concluded with an emergency management
plan designed to specifically assess local mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery activities in the area. The eight sections comprised in the CEMP are as follows:
Introduction, Planning Assumptions, CEMP Organization, Phases of Emergency
Management Activities, Concept of Operations, Levels of Emergency, and Roles &
Responsibilities. Moreover, the Great Spokane Emergency Management Office offers a
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range of resources for its community members. Such tools include volunteer
opportunities and open committees.

Spokane Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
The Introduction of the CEMP explicitly states the mission of the document: “The
primary objective for emergency management in Spokane is to provide a coordinated
effort from all supporting county and city departments/agencies/organizations in the
mitigation of, preparation for, response to, and recovery from injury, damage, or
suffering resulting from either a localized or widespread disaster” (“Comprehensive
Emergency Management Plan”, 2014). The CEMP’s guiding principles accompany this
mission as it seeks to protect citizens, property, and the environment. Saving human lives
is the CEMP’s utmost priority, followed by the preservation of property in continuation
to ensure the overall safety of its residents. In sum, the CEMP is the Basic Plan of
Spokane’s emergency management operations and disaster responsibilities. It is noted
that the CEMP cannot guarantee the fulfillment of the GSEM’s duties and Plan, as the
extent of disasters and their destruction is unforeseeable. It is advised for all residents to
prepare their households with the necessary disaster supplies for a 72-hour period.
Under the Planning Assumptions & Considerations section, the CEMP cites
flooding, storms, wildland fires, earthquakes, and volcanoes as the area’s most likely
natural disasters to impact the Spokane community (“Comprehensive Emergency Plan”,
2014). Based on these natural disasters, the CEMP compiled a set of assumptions that
were taken into account throughout the creation of the document. It is understood within
the CEMP that tremendous tragedy and destruction can occur, but it is expected of
community members and businesses to be prepared for the impact of disasters. The
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support and utilization of the local community, government, and resources are heavily
emphasized within this section.
The Concept of Operations section describes the role of the Basic Plan within the
CEMP. It is stated that the structure and procedures recommended are in concurrence
with federal protocols and the National Incident Management System, which allows for
the integration of federal, state, local, tribal, private, and non-governmental organizations
in the Spokane area (“Comprehensive Emergency Plan”, 2014).
The Phases of Emergency Management section empowers the CEMP to meet its
mission of protection of life and property. The five core phases of emergency are
prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation, all of which are thoroughly
weighed within this segment (“Comprehensive Emergency Plan”, 2014). First, the goal of
prevention is to avert the possibility of a major disaster to the area through collection,
analyzation, and application of data. From prevention, the next step in emergency
management is preparedness. This phase emphasizes the necessity of minimizing the
event in conjunction with informing the public of the necessary details, procedures, and
activities. Actions in association with preparedness will only be implemented if they have
the potential to preserve lives and property. Furthermore, each department in the county
will construct personalized Standard Operating Guides in order to address their
capabilities and responsibilities that will be enacted in case of disaster (“Comprehensive
Emergency Management Plan”, 2014). The employees and staff will receive appropriate
emergency training, and drills will be enforced. Based on the results of these measures,
the CEMP will be able to enhance its planning and protocols for the future. Additionally,
other preparedness functions for the community include the pre-distribution of resources,
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organization of command posts and mobilization centers, and the order of evacuation and
shelter (“Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan”, 2014).
Following preparedness, the response phase is enacted. Once again, the value of
life and property is held as the highest priority, and immediate and short-term responses
will be enacted to alleviate the severity of the disaster. In compliance with the CEMP,
departments and agencies will be required to equip the community with information,
supplies, and services to enhance the relief efforts. Disaster response efforts involves
factors such as public health and safety, search and rescue, emergency shelter,
transportation, and medical services (“Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan”,
2014). Furthermore, the process of recovery entails the revitalization of the community
post-disaster. Programs and resources will be made available to individuals who
desperately need these necessities. Clean up, repair of public facilities, counseling, and
temporary housing are all actions that can be implemented during this stage. The final
component of this series is mitigation. Gathering data from the prior incident will enable
the CEMP to enhance its functions and emergency management operations. Moreover,
increased education and outreach can be made readily accessible to the community and
its members in order to reduce the risk of lives and property lost during future disasters.
The conclusion of the Phases of Emergency Management section notes the
administrative duties necessary for the structure of CEMP and its operations. It highlights
the utilization of emergency declarations and requests for state or federal assistance when
the emergency appears insurmountable for the local body to solely handle
(“Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan”, 2014). More significantly, the local
governance of Spokane’s emergency management department is defined in this sector. As
stated, the Emergency Coordination Center (ECC) serves as the control center of the
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emergency management operations (“Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan”,
2014). The organization, communication, and coordination of the system’s processes is
conducted from this location. The GSEM Duty Officer is charged with the responsibility
of its functions. Lastly, the section accounts for the Continuity of Government and
Operations Plans. The protocols for lines of succession, preservation of records, and core
operational functions are critically detailed.
The succeeding section contains the Levels of Emergency Action. The CEMP
constructed a table listing the levels from one to five, with the severity of the incident
being determined by the escalation of the numbers (“Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan”, 2014). The following bullet points illustrate the characteristics of
each level in regards to natural disasters:
● Level 1: no severe weather pending; general daily operations are conducted;
steady communication; minor and controlled incidents
● Level 2: localized incident and potentiality as a county wide incident; controlled
by first responders; continued communication; weather advisories; alert and
organization of teams; possibility of enacting ECC
● Level 3: incident is county wide concern and ECC is activated; countywide
monitoring; use of countywide assets
● Level 4: county incident and potential catastrophe; use of county assets; activation
of ECC; possibility of requesting state assets
● Level 5: catastrophe; state and federal assets are utilized
The purpose of the emergency levels is to enhance the decision-making and efficiency of
the GSEM when a disaster accumulates.
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Continuing, the Roles and Responsibilities section outlines preparedness,
response, and designated organization responsibilities. The preparedness responsibilities
ensure that Spokane and its municipal departments employ essential emergency-related
functions in addition to their daily functions (“Comprehensive Emergency Management
Plan”, 2014). The department director is appointed the role of creating and maintaining
the entity’s emergency management planning. As a result, certain responsibilities and
expectations are formed in the department, such as matching employee job descriptions
to their emergency duties and connecting with other departments to better emergency
operations. In contrast, there is a set of response responsibilities that are present within
each department. These mandates encompass a range of actions, from the suspension of
business activities to the release of public information to news and media sources. The
final sector of responsibilities pertains to the delegation of partnered organizations. The
list cites thirty-two organizations as integral components of the emergency operations,
including the Spokane Transit Authority, Local Law Enforcement, the Interstate
Fairgrounds, and the Spokane Regional Clean Air Agency (“Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan”, 2014).
The concluding section of the Basic Plan is entitled Preparedness and
Maintenance. It ensures that the CEMP is constantly evolving to accommodate to new
policies, technologies, and directives that would benefit the operation. Unfortunately, the
document does not uphold this standard being that it has not been updated since 2014.
The CEMP does, however, provide a point of contact if any reader has inquiries
regarding its composition.
In addition to the CEMP, GSEM provides preparedness guides for individuals in
the area. The office suggests for citizens to create a preparedness plan for families and
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directs them to resources, such as FEMA, for guidance. Also, the necessity of a Grab-nGo Kit is emphasized. GSEM advises to include the following contents: three-day supply
of water, change of clothing, first aid kit, weather/disaster radio, flashlight, extra set of
car keys, cash, traveler’s checks, sanitation supplies, items for infants, elderly or disabled
family members, glasses/contacts, family documents, and pet supplies (“Build a Kit”,
2019). The findings of this section have been summarized in Table 2 on the following
page.
Table 2. Spokane Emergency Management Plan Overview
Plan Leadership
Plan
Organization

Disasters
Anticipated
Disaster Rating

Resources
Utilization
Volunteer
Management
Disaster
Preparedness

Greater Spokane Emergency Management Office (GSEM)
Introduction
Planning Assumptions
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) Organization
Phases of Emergency Management Activities
Concept of Operations
Levels of Emergency
Roles & Responsibilities
Natural Disasters (flooding, storms, wildland fires, earthquakes, and volcanoes)
Level 1: no severe weather pending; general daily operations are conducted; steady
communication; minor and controlled incidents
Level 2: localized incident and potentiality as a county wide incident; controlled by first
responders; continued communication; weather advisories; alert and organization of teams;
possibility of enacting ECC
Level 3: incident is county wide concern and ECC is activated; countywide monitoring; use
of countywide assets
Level 4: county incident and potential catastrophe; use of county assets; activation of ECC;
possibility of requesting state assets
Level 5: catastrophe; state and federal assets are utilized
Integration of federal, state, local, tribal, private, and non-governmental organizations in the
Spokane area
Coordinated through Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD)
Local Emergency Planning Committee- pursues strengthened planning and communication
between its citizens, businesses, and government
Washington State Homeland Security Region 9- mission is to reduce the effect of disasters
through education and training
Community Organizations Active in Disaster (COAD)- vision is to create a community
resilient to disaster

41

Spokane Volunteer Opportunities
Although the CEMP does little to provide specific direction and resources for the
public, Greater Spokane Emergency Management (GSEM) offers many resources on its
website for involvement in volunteer activities. The department advocates for the agency,
Volunteer Spokane. Through this outlet, individuals can be connected to disaster
response organizations in the area. Additionally, GSEM asserts the need for trained
volunteers and their ability to assist first responders during times of crisis and disaster.
The website encourages individuals to participate in the following supported
organizations: the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), the Radio Amateur
Emergency Service/Radio Amateur Emergency Services (ARES/RACES), the Mobile
Emergency Operations Center (MEOC), and the Spokane County Search and Rescue
(“Volunteer Opportunities”, 2019).
The first organization, DART, is coordinated through FEMA (“DART”, 2019). It
allows volunteers to connect with emergency management officials in advance in order to
assess the capabilities and strengths of each interested individual. When a disaster does
occur, DART can employ volunteers to respond to the scene based on their individual
qualifications. The organization also offers training opportunities to enhance and acquire
valuable skills that could be utilized during disaster response (“DART”, 2019).
Ultimately, the goal of DART is to promote volunteer participation as well as to ensure
that volunteer operations are efficient and accessible.
Volunteers involved in ARES/RACES are typically licensed radio technicians or
operators. However, the roles of the two organizations differ. Members of ARES transmit
messages before, during, and after an emergency (“ARES/RACES”, 2019). They bridge
communications between the public and emergency management officials. In contrast,
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RACES is activated when an emergency occurs and continues thereafter until the disaster
has dissipated (“ARES/RACES”, 2019). The role of RACES is to assist in
communications between government officials at all levels.
The Spokane County Search and Rescue provides another opportunity for local
volunteer activity. Under the Spokane County Sheriff’s office, the organization seeks to
assist law enforcement in search and rescue efforts and is comprised of different teams
that are assigned to certain jurisdictions and events (“Spokane County Search and
Rescue”, 2019). The teams range from the Winter Knights, who offer ATV services for
both summer and snow elements, to the Inland Northwest Search and Rescue, whose
personnel respond in all seasons and environments (“SAR Council and Teams”, 2019).
Additionally, the Explorer Search and Rescue team is open to both youth and young adult
volunteers to encourage early involvement and administer proper search and rescue
training (“SAR Council and Teams”, 2019).
An extension of the Spokane County Search and Rescue is the Mobile Emergency
Operations Center (MEOC). This resource and its volunteers are utilized as a mobile
control center that aids in “diverse situations” that may arise in the community
(“Volunteer Opportunities”, 2019). The MEOC is also employed through the local law
enforcement and fire departments.
Spokane Committees
To achieve optimal efficiency for disaster planning and response, GSEM has
yielded a number of committees to assist in their operations. These groups are open to all
members of the community as they collaborate and produce bettered emergency
preparedness. For example, the Local Emergency Planning Committee pursues
strengthened planning and communication between its citizens, businesses, and
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government (“LEPC”, 2019). To accomplish this goal, the committee consists of local
representatives from the government, elected officials, industry, environmental groups,
and other entities.
Another group highlighted by the GSEM is Washington State Homeland Security
Region 9. The coalition hopes to reduce the effect of disasters in the area through its core
values: partnership & leadership, communication, prevention of attacks, reduction of
vulnerabilities, education & training, and reduction of damage & recovery (“WA State
Region 9”, 2019). GSEM heads the efforts of Region 9 and oversees ten counties as well
as the Kalispell and Spokane tribes.
Community Organizations Active in Disaster (COAD) is also present in the
community. The Spokane County COAD declares its vision “to create a community
resilient from disasters” (“COAD”, 2016). Participants can receive numerous networking
opportunities, workshops, and seminars that are focused on disaster efforts (“COAD”,
2016). Through its mission statement, COAD seeks to build cooperation, coordination,
collaboration, and communication in the community, and a variety of local organizations
have partnered in these efforts. From Catholic Charities Spokane, to Gonzaga University,
COAD has benefitted from and equipped a diverse body of community entities within the
sector of emergency management (“COAD”, 2016).
Spokane Analysis
In its entirety, GSEM is thorough in its approach to emergency management,
however, its disaster plan is not concise nor clearly organized. The CEMP itself is
difficult to follow and relies on many assumptions that are unlikely to hold during a
disaster. While I admire GSEM’s efforts to incorporate the opinions of local
organizations and residents, the document would have greatly benefited from the
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expertise and knowledge of a varied group of individuals trained in emergency
management as well governmental officials in its creation of the CEMP. It is not prudent
to expect that local citizens possess a sufficient knowledge of disaster preparedness and
response to create a comprehensive, well-developed emergency management document.
Furthermore, the CEMP is highly reliant on outside sources at the state and federal levels.
When a disaster occurs, it is imperative that the response quick and efficient. Waiting on
resources rather than being equipped to handle the disaster competently and effectively
until reinforcements arrive can be disastrous.
With that being said, GSEM does offer many online resources to encourage
community involvement in emergency management and volunteer opportunities. The
open committee meetings demonstrate transparency to residents, thereby allowing them
to stay informed on the policies and directives affecting their city. In addition, I commend
GSEM’s action toward increasing volunteerism in the community, especially in programs
that focus on disaster response and relief. The more residents who can respond to
emergent situations in the area, the more secure and safe the community remains. Like
Red Stick Ready, GSEM could benefit from a program that incorporates their services
and collaborates with other relief agencies for an effective and purposeful response.
Information and education may be readily available, but organization and utilization of
this valued resource is lacking. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to anticipate that citizens
will be able to respond and act as intended, as the nature and magnitude of the disaster
may prevent their ability to provide assistance. In theory the CEMP is inclusive, unifying
and philanthropic in its impression; however, in reality, there is uncertainty that in the
wake of disaster, whether this plan will be able to deliver on its promise to prepare,
respond, and recover from localized or widespread destruction in a coordinated and
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collaborative manner. Likewise, the role of disaster management is dynamic and evolving
as new information is gleaned and additional resources become available, yet the CEMP
was last revised in 2014, leading one to wonder if the parties involved in the last revision
are still intact and cognizant of the responsibilities should disaster warrant their response.
Case #3: Oklahoma City, OK
The jurisdiction of Oklahoma City, OK, has developed an Emergency Operation
Plan (EOP) through the City of Oklahoma City Office of Emergency Management. The
EOP is compiled in sixty-one pages and includes appendices to address more detailed
aspects of the document. It is divided into fifteen primary sections:
1. Purpose, Scope, Situations, and Assumptions
2. Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
3. Types of Emergencies and Disasters
4. Incident/Disaster Priorities
5. Interjurisdictional Responsibilities
6. Mission Areas
7. Pre-Incident Management Actions
8. Incident Actions
9. Post-Incident Actions
10. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities
11. Direction, Control, and Coordination
12. Information Collection and Dissemination
13. Communications
14. Administration-Finance-Logistics
15. Plan Development and Maintenance
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In addition to the EOP, the department provides a variety of resources and information
through its program Prepare OKC. Table 3 highlights the contents of Oklahoma City’s
preparedness plans.
The City of Oklahoma City Emergency Operations Plan
The EOP begins with its Purpose, Scope, Situations, and Assumptions. It states
that the document offers the framework for preparation, prevention, protection,
mitigation, response and recovery of emergencies, which the EOP addresses as
“incidents/disasters” (“City of OKC”, 2017). It is classified as an all-hazards plan that
assists in the security of the health, safety, and general welfare of the public. The EOP
first presents basic information about the area in order to provide the knowledge
necessary to continue with the reading of the report. Encompassing a span of 622.5
square miles, Oklahoma City expands into the counties of Oklahoma, Canadian,
Cleveland, and Pottawatomie (“City of OKC”, 2017). The city is subject to numerous
natural disasters that include tornadoes, wildfires, earthquakes, high winds, extreme heat,
lightning, hail, winter weather, and flooding.
Next, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) section offers insight to its
emergency management actions. It is stated that the EOP is always active and certain
components of the document will be activated as needed to accommodate the particular
incident. A Declaration of a State of Emergency is not needed to enact the EOP’s
procedures, but it can assist in expediting emergency response and recovery (“City of
OKC”, 2017). Those permitted to issue a Declaration are the State Governor, the City
Council (through a resolution), and the Mayor. Communication will be administered
through a diverse collection of channels in order to ensure that the declaration has been
widely distributed.
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Due to incidents variability in scope, the EOP divides them into five different
types. They include:
● Type 5: one or two resources utilized; the incident is contained within a few
hours; Incident Command System (ICS) and General Staff are not activated
● Type 4: several resources are utilized; ICS and General Staff are only activated if
necessary; consists of one operational period
● Type 3: requires attention extending initial response capabilities; some or possibly
all ICS and General Staff are activated; could require multiple operational periods
● Type 2: requires resources beyond local capabilities; the majority or all ICS and
General Staff are utilized; multiple operational periods needed
● Type 1: the most complex incident; regional, state, and national resources
required; all ICS and General Staff are activated
To adequately respond to these types, the EOP boldly states its management priorities
(“City of OKC”, 2017). First and foremost, life safety is the ultimate concern. The
security of the public will be the primary assessment of first responders. Secondly, it is
important that the incident is stabilized, and its effects are minimized. This will
ultimately ensure the life safety of the public as well. Finally, property and environmental
preservation will be evaluated.
Through Interjurisdictional Responsibilities, the EOP proclaims that the City of
Oklahoma City will assume the response efforts of incidents/disasters within its city
limits. Because of this, the Canadian, Cleveland, Oklahoma, and Pottawatomie counties
are activated in disasters at all times. In addition, the Mission Areas of the EOP are
defined in this section: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.
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The Pre-Incident Management sector covers the aforementioned mission areas in
clear detail. It states that the EOP itself is a measure of preparedness as the City of
Oklahoma City’s primary resource for emergency management (“The City of OKC”,
2017). Through constant collaboration with City departments and entities, the EOP and
its structure is upheld for proper emergency planning. Additionally, the City partners with
the Oklahoma Urban Area Security Initiative to implement current training protocols and
exercise plans for the municipality. In regards to prevention, the EOP relies on a set of
core capabilities, such as public information and intelligence sharing, in order to subdue
terrorist attacks (“City of OKC”, 2017). Based on the community’s history, terrorism is a
relevant threat and takes precedence to natural disasters in relation to prevention efforts.
However, the portion of this section dedicated to protection adheres to both terrorism and
natural disasters. The City works to ensure that the living conditions are safe, and the
“interests, aspirations, and way of life” are secured through the reduction of eminent risks
(“City of OKC”, 2017). Lastly, the mitigation efforts of Oklahoma City are enacted either
prior to, during, or after an incident/disaster. Strategies are created and implemented to
lessen loss of life and property damage, and thus generate long-lasting benefits such as
economic development and environmental sustainability (“City of OKC”, 2017).
The Incident Actions section addresses specific response and recovery measures
when a disaster occurs. This includes supplying “basic human needs” and “services” to
the community while carrying out the responsibility of saving lives and maintaining the
situation at hand (“City of OKC”, 2017). A unique passage of this section emphasizes
the care of people with disabilities. The EOP lists concepts that can be applied to
response protocols. For example, it is important to note the idea of No “One-Size-FitsAll” as “people with disabilities do not all require the same assistance and do not all have
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the same needs” (“City of OKC”, 2017). Through means such as medical equipment and
service dogs, there are a diverse set of possibilities to assist those with disabilities.
Another interest highlighted in the EOP is domestic plants and animals. The City ensures
that this group will be administered the proper care they need through rescue, shelters,
medical attention, and supplies. Finally, to ensure that all these goods and services can be
transported efficiently, the EOP has developed an Emergency Traffic Flow Plan and cited
Ambulance Points of Distribution (“City of OKC”, 2017). This allows emergency teams
to reach people in need regardless of debris, destruction, and traffic.
The main venture of the Post-Incidents Activities section is that of recovery
efforts, as restoration and revitalization are its vital components. The Local Disaster
Recovery Manager (LDRM) is charged with the organization and implementation of
recovery activities in Oklahoma City (“City of OKC”, 2017). One of these
responsibilities includes the creation of a Disaster Recovery Task Force (DRTF) that is
comprised of a broad set of local individuals to assess the incident at hand (“City of
OKC”, 2017). Additionally, a range of assessments should be completed that address
both the physical impact and social impact on the community; they include the topics of
Damage, Debris, Site, Properties in Special Flood Hazard Areas, and Victim’s Needs
(“City of OKC”, 2017). Lastly, it must be determined whether the magnitude of effects
caused by the incident will require short-term or long-term efforts. Short term recovery
can pertain to activities such as demolition, donations management, or infrastructure
restoration, while long term recovery can include functions such as historic preservation,
public health recovery, and disaster memorialization (“City of OKC”, 2017).
Through the Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities section, the order
and authority of the EOP is established. The Mayor and City Council hold all policy
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making decisions as the city officials and employees carry out their commands. The
section pays specific attention to the organization of disaster volunteers. The EOP notes
the challenge that an influx of volunteers can create, but it provides a management
strategy to control the situation. Prior to an emergency, it is pertinent to encourage
citizens to affiliate with a volunteer organization in order to establish training and
regulation. During or after the disaster, the EOP has an assigned Liaison Officer to handle
communications and serve as an authority to the organization’s unaffiliated volunteers
(“City of OKC”, 2017). The Officer will provide information regarding the local
government’s response and what is needed from their services. To more efficiently
contain volunteer efforts, a Disaster Volunteer Center may be created off-site to establish
safety and correct operational procedures.
Next, the Direction, Control, and Coordination section mandates the use of
control centers in the area. When a disaster affects a general location, an Incident
Complex can be created nearby in order to increase organization and administrative
efforts (“City of OKC”, 2017). Additionally, Department Command Centers can be
instituted for specialization. For example, the Public Works Department serves for
Snow/Ice Operations, the Utilities Department pertains to broken water lines, and the
Oklahoma City County Health Department addresses the pandemic flu (“City of OKC”,
2017). However, the Multiagency Coordination Center (MAC) proves to be the most
collaborative measure as it is placed in a centralized location for all city departments to
access in case of disaster. For day-to-day functions, the MAC houses Oklahoma County
Emergency Management, Oklahoma City Emergency Management, and the Medical
Emergency Response Center (“City of OKC”, 2017).
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The Information Collection and Communications section is pivotal for the EOP. It
provides the outline to appropriately handle the gathering of information and its
dissemination to the public. First and foremost, information is utilized to make
appropriate decision-making for the community. The radio system is utilized as the most
reliable source for communications. All city departments are programmed within the
OKC AID radio system for priorities involving command, tactical operations, and
logistics (“City of OKC”, 2017). If the OKC AID system fails, amateur radio operators
will be used, or verbal and written messages will be employed.
The Administration-Finance-Logistics section serves to address the role of
documentation and reports. Incident Action Plans will be enacted based on the extent and
classification of the disaster. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of each department to
mandate its own policies and procedures and account for the time records of its
employees. After the disaster has occurred, Oklahoma City Emergency Management will
supervise a comprehensive review (“City of OKC”, 2017). Phase One is a “Hot Wash”
that allows response actors to voice their problems and concerns. This will be influential
in identifying issues and areas that need improvement in regards to disaster management
and its operations. Phase Two includes “Debriefing” that consists of formal meetings
outlining the specifics and details of the incident operations. At the conclusion of these
phases, an After-Action Report will be distributed summarizing the topics discussed.
Additionally, each department will be given a Corrective Action Plan detailing its areas
to augment and enhance in preparation for future incidents.
The Plan Development and Maintenance section is the conclusion of the EOP. It
cites the need for the document to remain up-to-date through policy changes and
implementation of new directives (“City of OKC”, 2017). A committee has been assigned
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to formally address these changes and apply them to the EOP as needed. Below, Table 3
illustrates the findings of this section:
Table 3. Oklahoma City Emergency Management Plan Overview
Plan Leadership
Plan Organization

City of Oklahoma
Purpose, Scope, Situations, and Assumptions
Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
Types of Emergencies and Disasters
Incident/Disaster Priorities
Interjurisdictional Responsibilities
Mission Areas
Pre-Incident Management Actions
Incident Actions
Post Incident Actions
Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities
Direction, Control, and Coordination
Information Collection and Dissemination
Communications
Administration-Finance-Logistics
Plan Development and Maintenance

Disasters
Anticipated

Terrorism
Natural disasters (tornadoes, wildfires, earthquakes, high winds, extreme heat, lightning,
hail, winter weather, and flooding)
Type 5: one or two resources utilized; the incident is contained within a few hours;
Incident Command System (ICS) and General Staff are not activated
Type 4: several resources are utilized; ICS and General Staff are only activated if
necessary; consists of one operational period
Type 3: requires attention extending initial response capabilities; some or possibly all ICS
and General Staff are activated; could require multiple operational periods
Type 2: requires resources beyond local capabilities; the majority or all ICS and General
Staff are utilized; multiple operational periods needed
Type 1: the most complex incident; regional, state, and national resources required; all
ICS and General Staff are activated

Disaster Rating

Resources
Utilization
Volunteer
Management
Disaster
Preparedness

Multiagency Coordination Center (MAC) – creates a centralized location for all city
departments to access in case of disaster
Plan encourages volunteers to affiliate with a relief organization
Liaison Officer- assigned to handle communications and serve as an authority to
unaffiliated volunteers
Disaster Volunteer Center- may be created to establish safe operational procedures
Urban Area Security Initiative- implements training protocols and exercise plans for the
municipalities
Prepare OKC- offers information, guides, and resources to effectively prepare for natural
disasters in the region

Prepare OKC
Through the City of Oklahoma City Office of Emergency Management (OKC
OEM), residents have online access to their program, Prepare OKC. It offers information,
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guides, and resources to effectively prepare for natural disasters in the region. Most
significantly, there are detailed pages pertaining to the area’s most vulnerable natural
disasters: thunderstorms, flash floods, winter weather, wildfires, and earthquakes (“Know
What to Do”, 2019). The information cites various resources, such as the National
Weather Services, for details about local warnings, as well as safety precautions.
Additionally, there is a thorough section on tornadoes that includes a video, warning
signs, and safety measures. OKC OEM ensures optimal security of the public through its
Outdoor Warning Sirens that notify the community when a tornado is near or present
(“Tornadoes”, 2019). It advises the public to take immediate shelter and continue
utilizing other resources for additional information.
The OKC OEM encourages residents to establish an emergency plan and build a
kit. The emergency plan should include the following pertinent details: family
information, common family locations, pet descriptions, meeting places, and emergency
numbers (“Prepare OKC”, 2019). The plan is to ensure that all members of the household
are accounted for and are informed about the necessary actions to take during a disaster.
Moreover, the kit is a beneficial supplement to the emergency plan. The kit should be
held in an airtight container and placed in an accessible location. Resources in the
container should include: food, water, radio, first aid kit, whistle, dust masks, basic tools,
can opener, local map, cash, medications, and pet supplies (“Prepare OKC”, 2019).
Supplies should be refilled and updated each year.
Oklahoma City Analysis
Upon review of Oklahoma City’s EOP, it is apparent that the city has a welldeveloped and clearly organized approach toward disaster management. The plan
addresses a multitude of components and aspects necessary to the functions of emergency
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preparedness and response. With a more defined government section that clarifies the
roles of each command position, the EOP would be a sound blueprint for other
emergency plans throughout the United States. The centralization of the Multiagency
Coordination Center, utilization of a scoring system to type events based on complexity
and resource utilization, and a proactive post disaster response review are crucial
components of a progressive emergency plan and a testament to the integrity of the plan’s
development.
However, I do believe that OKC OEM could update and enhance its Prepare
OKC program. Preparedness plans that are less generalized and focus more on targeted
populations such as families and children would be beneficial. Furthermore, the training
curriculum is not inviting nor enticing, which is vital for volunteer recruitment. Citizens
in the Oklahoma City area should feel valued as vital participants in disaster preparedness
and response, providing Prepare OKC with a great opportunity to recruit and train
individuals prior to a disaster or adverse event. I do commend the plan for encouraging
volunteers to affiliate with various relief organizations prior to a disaster. Furthermore,
the establishment of a Liaison Office to oversee spontaneous volunteers is imperative, but
without clearly defined communication and collaboration with the Command Center,
effective utilization of this resource could be challenging.
Document Analysis
Within this section, I have conducted a comparative analysis of the emergency
management plans examined. For clarity, a snapshot of the three documents is displayed
in Table 4 on the following page. The chart provides a general overview of the
emergency management plans of Baton Rouge, LA, Spokane, WA, and Oklahoma City,
OK.
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Table 4. Comparison Chart
Official Management Plan

Plan Manager

Local Emergency
Declaration

Responsible for Plan
Implementation
Comprehensive All
Hazards Plan
Plan utilizes FEMA’s Five
Phases of Management
(Prevention, Mitigation,
Preparedness, Response,
and Recovery)
Command Center During
Disaster
Staging Severity of
Emergency
Allocation of Resources

Volunteer Management

Continuity of Government

Most Catastrophic Event
Plan Last Revised

Baton Rouge
East Baton Rouge
Parish Emergency
Operations Plan (EOP)

Oklahoma City
City of Oklahoma City
Emergency Operations
Plan (EOP)

Director of Mayor’s
Office of Homeland
Security and
Emergency
Preparedness
(MOHSEP)
State Governor, Mayor,
or Director of
MOHSEP under
supervision of mayor

Oklahoma City
Emergency Management

Spokane
Greater Spokane
Comprehensive
Emergency Management
Plan (CEMP)
Greater Spokane
Emergency Management
(GSEM)

Mayor

State Governor or a
proper officer /agency of
the States, Resolution of
the City Council/City
Manager, or the Mayor
Mayor and City Council

Chief executive of the
local government

Yes

Yes

Greater Spokane
Emergency Management
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

City-Parish Emergency
Operations Center
(EOP)
No standard grading
system
Uses local and state
resources; Accesses
Federal resources only
if necessary

When activated, the
Multiagency Coordination
Center (MACC)
Grades emergencies
based on Types from 5-1
Utilizes local, state and
federal resources

Emergency Coordination
Center (ECC)

Coordinated through
Louisiana Capital Area
Volunteer Agencies
Active in Disaster
(LCAVOAD)
Established at state and
local level

Liaison Officer assigned
to work with volunteer
organizations; Disaster
Volunteer Center may be
established if needed
Not significantly
addressed in plan

August 2016 flooding13 killed, >100,000
homes damaged
June 2018

April 1995 bombing- 168
killed, > 650 injured

Local governments to
develop a Continuity of
Government Succession
List
September 1890
explosion- 15 killed

June 2017

December 2014

Utilizes Levels ranging
from 1-5
Integration of federal,
state, local, tribal, private,
and non-governmental
organizations in the
Spokane area
Coordinated through
Volunteer Organizations
Active in Disaster
(VOAD)

As Table 4 illustrates, the emergency management plans of these three cities,
while sharing similar aspects and core themes, differ in a range of facets. Table 5
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describes in further detail the differences that emerge from these documents. In regard to
disaster, the cities are prone to varying events. For instance, Baton Rouge has witnessed
the damaging effects of hurricanes and flooding alike, while Oklahoma City has been
victim to terrorism as well as destruction from natural disaster in the form of tornados.
Although Spokane cites a number of potential disasters, the area has yet to experience
devastation of the magnitude of either Baton Rouge or Oklahoma City. Therefore, one
can surmise that while the city of Spokane has a comprehensive emergency plan, the
absence of truly being tested, creates some uncertainty regarding its effectiveness during
times of catastrophe. Further, both Spokane and Oklahoma City have devised a tool for
staging disaster levels in order to evaluate the severity of the situation at hand, and hence,
communicate a more appropriate response. However, the grading tool for determining
disaster severity varies greatly between these two city governments. For instance,
Oklahoma City types disaster severity on a 5 – 1 scale, with a Type 5 described as a
benign event compared to a Type 1 requiring regional, state, and national resources. On
the other hand, Spokane grades disaster severity on levels from 1-5. In this scoring
system, a Level 1 rating is described as minor, while a Level 5 is catastrophic, requiring
state and federal response. The lack of a standardized scoring tool to grade disaster
severity can limit a plan’s effectiveness beyond the local level. The implementation and
utilization of a uniform scoring instrument would certainly communicate a more cohesive
response when calling upon agencies and resources during times of emergency.
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Table 5. Document Differences
Standardized Tool for
Disaster Staging
Continuity of
Government
Liaison Officer for
Volunteer Management
Partnership with local
VOAD

Baton Rouge

Oklahoma City

Spokane

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Limited

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No (only at the state
level)

The emergency management plans of Baton Rouge, Spokane, and Oklahoma City
all present unique, but valuable approaches to emergency management planning. In
particular, each city presents a varying approach to leadership. While Baton Rouge has a
well-established continuity of government plan at the local and state level, Oklahoma
City and Spokane fail to specifically define the chain of command among its leadership.
Failure to delineate this critical component of authority could be disastrous in times of
chaos and uncertainty.
Another component of disaster management is the safe and effective use of
volunteers, particularly spontaneous volunteers. The benevolent spirt of the American
people is a driving force behind this great resource. While the websites for Baton Rouge,
Oklahoma City, and Spokane strongly recommend affiliation with reputable relief
organizations, in reality, many will flock to a disaster site spontaneously and unaffiliated.
The local Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) as described in the Baton
Rouge’s emergency management plan is an excellent resource for the management of
volunteers during disaster. Likewise, the Disaster Volunteer Center established in the
Oklahoma City plan is also a valuable component of disaster management in that it
removes the volunteer pool from the center of emergency management and coordinates
this service offsite.
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Chapter 5-Discussion
In an age when disasters, natural or manmade, are imminent, it is imperative that
local, state, and federal agencies work collaboratively to create effective and efficient
emergency plans. Furthermore, it is necessary that we learn from the successes and
failures of past responses. Having studied the emergency plans of Baton Rouge, LA,
Spokane, Washington, and Oklahoma City, OK, I have derived at a few
recommendations. These plans, while extensive, should collaborate in greater detail with
medical facilities regarding anticipated casualties and medical needs. Regardless of how
effective a response plan may be, its success is limited if adequate medical services are
not available to meet those needs. Therefore, it is imperative that local communities have
procedures in place for obtaining the necessary medical services for its injured.
In addition, education and community outreach programs must continue to evolve
as disaster preparedness and response is a progressive and dynamic process. In
particular, standardization in the organization of volunteers is critical, and it is essential
that recruitment not only be aggressive but precede utilization. The importance of
empowering individuals to become active participants in their personal as well as
community’s safety is a valuable component of emergency preparedness. The federal
government should expand its role in ensuring that its citizens are well informed and
prepared for the unanticipated events following disaster. Programs should begin with our
children and utilize the resources of our first responders to train them in age appropriate
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first aid techniques. Efforts should be strengthened through our churches, colleges, job
sites and civic groups to encourage individuals to affiliate with relief organizations.
Various social media outlets as well as television and radio may also prove effective in
disseminating this information. Through the establishment of a national data base,
volunteers can register, and receive necessary training and education preemptively.
Furthermore, consistency among communities in the manner in which volunteers are used
is necessary to abate chaos and capitalize on the value of this resource. The organization
of active local VOADs coupled with offsite Disaster Volunteer Centers is an excellent
means of coordinating this effort during times of disaster.
Lastly, it is equally as important that cities and states receive the education and
resources they need to develop comprehensive emergency management programs as well
as to revise existing plans in order to improve safety in their communities. It is often said
that experience is the best teacher. Therefore, the establishment of effective interstate
communication outlets would be an instrumental tool in the dissemination of information
among states, particularly information from areas that have experienced disaster and have
garnered valuable information in the process. The opportunity to network with those who
have experienced crisis and tested their plans can provide useful insight to communities
facing adversity for the first time. From a small aspect, such as including an extra set of
car keys in a preparedness kit, to a larger operation, like a more established continuity of
government, communities will be better equipped and ready to respond when disaster
strikes. Additionally, uniformity among governments and their emergency management
plans allows bordering states and communities the ability to offer critical assistance
during difficult times with less disruption in emergency operations.
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Given the information gleaned from this analysis and utilizing the mentioned
recommendations, I propose an emergency management plan which can be found in
Table 6 below. I attest that city governments could benefit from a uniform approach.
Consistency among emergency management plans is imperative if a comprehensive and
cohesive approach to disaster response is expected. In no way do I discount the efforts
employed to develop strong emergency plans in the cities studied. However, I appreciate
the opportunity to progress disaster response through the integration of communal
terminology, advancement of volunteer utilization, and optimization of plans that mimic
one another in their approach and format.
Table 6. Proposed Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)
Section
INTRODUCTION

Description
Clearly defines the purpose and mission of the emergency
management department and its plan. Establishes ownership
of the plan and responsible party for plan implementation.
Gives specific details regarding the area’s geography as well
as a risk assessment of probable disasters.
Defines succession of leadership at the local and state level as
well as within the emergency management department.
Focuses on local resources, with implementation of statelevel resources when necessary. Utilizes Federal resources as
a last resort, as the reliability and speed of response is not
always predictable.
Outlines potential disasters that a region may be predisposed
to.
Utilizes a standardized national disaster staging tool to rate
severity of disaster. .
Clearly defines roles and responsibilities of emergency
management team during disaster response.
Designates individuals responsible for declaring a state of
emergency.
Applies federal protocols to local response operations.
Describes contents recommended in a federally approved
preparedness kit and encourages citizens to prepare kits prior
to disaster. Provides additional recommendations for distinct
preparedness kits (i.e. family, children, pet, elderly, family
members with disabilities).
Imparts accountability to citizens for their role in disaster
preparedness.
Provides first aid training programs and disaster education to
children.
Includes information of local VOADs and encourages
affiliation.

CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT

TYPES OF EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS
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OUTREACH

INCIDENT ACTIONS

RESOURCES AND ROLE OF RESPONSIBILITIES

VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT

COMMUNICATIONS

ADMINISTRATION
POST-INCIDENT ACTIONS

PLAN DEVELOPMENT
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Outlines the roles and responsibilities of city departments in
disaster preparedness.
Provides a schedule of disaster management meetings
between the emergency management department and all city
departments to assure clear communication.
Operates as an extension of preparedness efforts,
incorporating quarterly community-wide events to educate
citizens on emergency preparedness.
Recruits volunteers and encourages affiliation with partnered
relief organizations.
Utilizes radio, TV, and social media outlets as methods of
outreach.
Includes church, school, hospital, civic organization, and
employer support of disaster preparedness programming.
Implements communication between neighboring
communities and states to develop important relationships
that may be crucial during disaster response and recovery.
Highlights logistics of emergency management operations.
Institutes measures that utilize local resources within city
government and the community upon declaration of
emergency.
Provides a protocol for how and when state-level resources
will be accessed, and lastly, the engagement of federal
resources.
Develops and defines affiliations outside of the emergency
management department and city departments (i.e.
universities, hospitals).
Defines criteria for the institution of a Multiagency
Coordination Center (MAC), and an Emergency Operations
Center (EOC). The MAC acts as an outlet and centralized
location for city government departments to collaborate. The
EOC serves as an on-site location for the emergency
management department to conduct its responsibilities.
Establishes a Disaster Volunteer Center off site, when
indicated, to register, train, and assign responsibilities to
spontaneous volunteers.
Assigns a Liaison Officer to manage the Disaster Volunteer
Center and to serve as a liaison, coordinating needs with
available volunteer resources.
Liaison Officer works closely with the local VOAD to
coordinate volunteer resources safely and efficiently.
Assigns a Public Information Officer to disseminate accurate
information to the media. Additionally, the Public
Information Officer manages the social medial account and
communicates official messages from the emergency
management office to the public.
Defines administrative duties in relation to finances, disaster
reporting, and document protection.
Utilizes information from recovery, restoration, and
revitalization operations to make important decisions
regarding post incident actions. The efforts could be longterm or short-term, depending on the magnitude of the
disaster.
Assesses disaster response and relief efforts and utilizes this
information to make recommendations for plan revisions and
development.
Utilizes disaster management information to amend the EOP
as indicated.

Chapter 6-Conclusion
The valiant efforts of the mentioned city governments and their emergency
management departments are commendable. It is evident that the safety and preservation
of lives is of utmost importance. Yet, it is only through experience and careful
examination that the effectiveness of these emergency management plans and their
operations can be tested.
Utilizing the information garnered in this analysis, one thing is clear: Emergency
management is a complex and exhaustive entity. It is evident that many aspects of
disaster management cannot be easily altered due to local and state regulations. However,
the utilization of volunteers, and in particular spontaneous volunteers, is one area exempt
from many of these regulatory challenges. While there are numerous reputable relief
organizations available for affiliation, the fact remains that numerous individuals are
compelled to respond spontaneously in times of disaster. This instinctive trait, while
noble, presents numerous challenges that jeopardize the safety of these individuals as
well as disrupt the operations of emergency response. Therefore, it is essential that
directives be initiated at the federal level to ensure that this valuable resource is utilized
safely and in a manner that coordinates their skills and expertise with appropriate tasks.
Through the implementation of a federal guideline, spontaneous volunteers can
adequately apply the operational mandates and directives from one city to another. Time
is critical during a disaster, and the elimination of wasted hours to educate, inform, and
train is vital to efficient emergency response operations.
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As determined in this analysis, the utilization of spontaneous volunteers is
managed differently among the plans examined. Coordinating these efforts consistently
and uniformly among all communities would provide a more predictable outcome for
success. In fact, each of the three plans utilize valuable strategies for managing
volunteers, but the overall approach is underdeveloped. By combining the efforts of each,
a cohesive and comprehensive management solution can be established. Therefore, I
propose the implementation of three key elements to the volunteer management section
of all emergency management plans:
1) Establishment of a Disaster Volunteer Center
2) Coordination with local Volunteers Active in Disaster (VOAD)
3) Assignment of a Volunteer Management Liaison
To begin, it is imperative that a decentralized Disaster Volunteer Center be
established during times of adversity in order to remove this aspect of emergency
response from the critical operations of a command center. Likewise, it is necessary that a
Liaison Officer be assigned to activate volunteer operations through the utilization of
local VOADs. Furthermore, the Liaison Officer would serve as critical component of
disaster response by bridging the gap between emergency management officials and
volunteer leadership, communicating needs and resources among the two entities.
Through this model, spontaneous volunteers would be directed to the volunteer center,
along with the partnered organizations. There, spontaneous volunteers would be assessed,
registered, trained, and assigned responsibilities. Critical to this operation is the necessity
for local VOAD participation. Local VOADs are familiar with the area, its resources, and
its needs. Their connection to the area provides for a prompt and timely response to
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disaster. Therefore, it is essential that local VOADs be established as their expertise and
knowledge to the region is crucial.
To conclude, this thesis has sought to examine preparedness efforts and the
implementation of volunteer management within emergency management planning.
While varying differences are noted among the three plans discussed, attempts at
developing comprehensive and cohesive strategies toward emergency management are
often restrained due to variances across local and state jurisdictions. However, the role of
volunteer utilization is one area immune from many of these regulatory constraints.
Thus, there is great opportunity to develop a comprehensive and uniform policy that
crosses community boundaries and state borders. I truly believe that with willful intent,
emergency management teams can work collaboratively to establish complementary
guidelines to effectively utilize spontaneous volunteers. By tapping into this valuable and
committed resource, disaster response efforts will be strengthened, and community
recovery can be optimized.
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